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In the 1944 invasion of Normandy I was commander of “C” Troop, 14th Battery, 4th 
Field Regiment Royal Canadian Artillery, a unit 
of the Second Canadian Infantry Division.
On the morning of 20 July Lieutenant-Colonel 
Bud Drury, CO of the Regiment, ordered me 
to proceed immediately to an “O” Group at the 
Mayor’s office in Faubourg de Vaucelles (east 
of Caen) and to act as his representative and 
forward observation officer (FOO) with the 
Fusiliers Mont-Royal (FMR) in a brigade attack. 
This I did with some puzzlement as I normally 
worked with 4th Brigade battalions and had 
trained with them for several years in England. 
I did not know anyone in the FMR, but assumed 
my selection was because I had some slight battle 
experience with the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry 
(RHLI) and the Royal Regiment of Canada (RRC), 
whereas 6th Brigade and its FOOs were still 
unblooded; also two of my observation post (OP) 
crew were bilingual.
I remember eating apples picked off the mayor’s 
tree in the yard of the “mairie” while the senior 
officers tried to hammer out some difficulties, 
which I believe involved adding the Essex 
Scottish of 4th Brigade to 6th Brigade. This 
was a surprise, as we had never trained with a 
four-battalion formation, and it did not fit our 
usual tactical patterns.  [Each brigade in 2nd 
Division was comprised of 3 battalions.] The 
Brigade intelligence officer told us that British 
reconnaissance units reported seeing no enemy 
between Ifs and Verrières, the proposed route 
of the 6th Brigade assault. The camouflaged 
Germans had held their fire, it turned out.
I proceeded to the start line, just south of the 
village of Ifs, and joined up with Captain Fernand 
Mousseau of “C” Company, the FMR.  He and 
his men had been marching since dawn, with 
no breakfast and no lunch, and they had been 
awakened very early in the morning; hardly good 
preparation for their first battle!  Nonetheless 
they were cheerful and spirited.
I explained to him the nature of our barrage and 
the importance of staying behind the start line 
and not getting too close to the falling shells as 
we advanced.  He and his men were eager to 
go, although very hungry, and at 1445 hours 
the barrage, fired by many artillery regiments, 
opened.  [There had just been time to lay on 
a creeping barrage. As well, the depth of the 
assault required many lifts and therefore a great 
quantity of ammunition.] The infantry followed 
the bursting shells at a respectful distance after 
two men were wounded.
I was with one of the lead platoons and had two 
signalers on foot accompanying me. My carrier 
followed behind the infantry company. One 
signaler carried a short range radio set (No.38) 
to communicate with my carrier and the other a 
No.18 set on the FMR net (both back-packs). We 
all toted rifles to look as much like infanteers as 
possible, and I had my camouflage scarf wound 
over my epaulettes to hide my captain’s pips. 
My binoculars (oversize 12 power) were tucked 
inside my battledress blouse and my folded map 
was in the large thigh pocket of my trousers.
We started taking prisoners almost immediately 
and also came under fire from snipers and MG 
42s hiding in stooks of cut grain, which dotted 
some of the fields. The FMR 2-inch mortar 
men dropped a few phosphorous bombs on the 
stooks, setting them on fire and this pretty soon 
cut down on the sniping. The enemy infantry 
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were, I think, from the 272nd Division (mostly 
non-Germans) and formed a screen in front of 
the 12th SS Panzer, an elite, tough crew of Nazi 
Party members. They had dug slit trenches under 
the grain stooks which protected them from our 
barrage to some extent. Also the German armour 
and self-propelled anti-tank guns were sited in 
pits gouged out by a bulldozer, so that only their 
weapons were visible. This meant that our tanks 
behind us had great difficulty spotting targets and 
suffered severe casualties.  My bren gun carrier 
was not fired upon, although several nearby 
T-16 carriers which were towing 17-pounder 
and 6-pounder anti-tank guns were knocked 
out early on.
It was a hot July day with little wind, so the smell 
of burning rubber and paint from the tanks and 
carriers on fire, the smoke from blazing wheat 
sheaves and the smell of burning flesh was a 
dramatic accompaniment to the continuous 
crash of the 25-pound shells bursting steadily in 
front of us; also there was much screaming. Very 
shortly we had quite a large number of prisoners 
- I counted a batch of 45 at one time. We used 
them to carry wounded of both sides to the rear 
on gates.  Eight prisoners as porters and two 
wounded to a gate.
We followed the prescribed drill of jamming the 
bayonet of a wounded man’s rifle upright in the 
ground, so that his location was marked. The 
rifle of course stood up above the grain in the 
uncut fields.  [Our toad-stabber bayonets were 
best used to puncture tins of milk for tea and 
not good for this. We missed our original issue 
of WWI type sword-bayonets.]
Each officer carried two syrettes of morphine and 
these were eventually used up on badly wounded 
men. The kit included an indelible purple pencil, 
which we licked and used to make a big “M” 
on the man’s forehead, to avoid an accidental 
overdose.
And so we fought our way forward about two 
kilometres to Troteval Farm while at the same 
time “B” Company on our right was advancing 
on Beauvoir Farm.  Major Gauthier, commanded 
“B” Company and Captain Gordon Hunter from 
my regiment was the FOO with him.  Gordon was 
badly wounded later that day and Captain Reg 
Parker, another of our 4th Field FOOs, was killed 
that afternoon near Ifs with the Essex Scottish. 
When we reached the farms we encountered 
troops of the 12th SS Division and there was 
some fierce fighting until they withdrew. A 
couple of German Mark IV tanks were knocked 
out by our armour in support close to Verrières 
village, which was only a few hundred yards from 
Troteval Farm.  However, the tiger tanks and 
infantry appeared to have pulled back to their 
reserve position under cover of the smoke which 
obscured the view of our own tanks. This was 
standard German tactics. The artillery fire plan 
ended at the farms, I believe, and “D” Company 
FMR then passed between us and “B” Company to 
attack Verrières. The 12th SS hit them very hard, 
and forced them to withdraw with no ground 
gained and many casualties.
Major Mousseau and I started to consolidate 
around Troteval Farm, all of us digging slit 
trenches well away from the farm buildings 
to avoid being obvious targets.  He and I were 
talking beside a stone wall when some one threw 
an egg grenade over and it burst between us. The 
skin of these bombs is very thin metal, and so 
we suffered only minor cuts.  Happily it was not 
a stick grenade!  I asked the captain in one of 
the tanks who had by then come up, if he could 
knock a hole in the wall. This he did quite easily 
and I quickly jumped through after the tank, 
looking for the perpetrator of the grenade attack. 
Suddenly the Sherbrooke officer ducked down 
yelling a warning and slammed his turret lid. 
I turned around to face a German NCO with a 
Schmeisser aimed at me!  He gave me one burst, 
turned and fled into some nearby berry bushes 
as the tank turret was swinging down toward 
him with its co-ax machine gun firing. I felt like 
I had been kicked in the gut, but there was no 
blood, for a very good reason. I had been cursing 
the body armour which assault infantry and 
OP crews wore, but now I fervently gave thanks 
that I had it on. There were two, one-inch deep 
pits pushed into the chest plate! The battery 
quartermaster some days later replaced it, but 
it then became a regimental curio for a while. 
The 9 mm ammunition used by the Germans 
was shorter, lighter and had less punch than our 
own, although it would fit in our 9 mm pistols 
and stens.
While we were digging in, a heavy burst of rain 
struck us, soaking everyone to the skin and filling 
our slit trenches with mud. However, under cover 
of the rain, the company sergeant-major of the 
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FMR reached our position in a jeep carrying 
two dixies of stew and coffee (or tea? - I forget) 
kept warm in hay boxes. He also brought cases 
of .303 ammunition, 2-inch mortar bombs and 
No.36 grenades, but no PIAT ammo. The FMR 
grabbed first for the ammunition boxes, ripping 
them open and stuffing the loose rounds into 
their bren magazines, most of which were empty. 
The riflemen took the cloth bandoliers, each of 
which contained several five-round clips, and 
after filling their pouches slung the remaining 
khaki bandoliers around their necks. Then they 
went at the food, having had nothing for 24 hours! 
Good discipline!
The arrival of the ammo was well timed, as the 
first of many counterattacks developed shortly 
after, coming from the village of Verrières a few 
hundred yards ahead of us. Major Mousseau 
asked for artillery fire and I brought the 
battery down on a defensive task out in front 
of our position, which I had already registered. 
Suddenly there was a snicking sound above us 
and twigs and leaves showered down from the tall 
Lombardy poplars which lined the lane where we 
stood. I realized that my guns were firing charge 
3, or a very flat trajectory at that range, and 
that we were in considerable danger. I quickly 
switched to charge 2 which lowered the muzzle 
velocity and raised the guns. After that the shells 
came in at a safe height. Thank God none hit a 
solid branch and ‘air burst’ overhead.
The two surviving tanks were ordered back to 
“Laager” for the night. We protested loudly but 
their commanders said they had to replenish 
fuel and ammunition. They swung their guns 
around over their stems and draped a huge 
yellow cloth triangle over each turret to identify 
them as friendly.  (Smaller yellow cloth triangles 
were carried by all of us, with a loop around our 
neck and smaller loops on the other two corners 
for our thumbs. To identify us when we came 
under friendly fire (usually from our aircraft), 
we stuck our thumbs into the two loops and 
snapped the triangle out of our breast pocket as 
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identification.) When the tanks were just clear 
of our position, a dug-in German SP gun very 
close on our left fired with a horrendous crash 
and a round screeched over our heads striking 
the upper part of one tank’s turret with an 
enormous shower of sparks. The turret rocked 
up and crashed over the side, although the 
tank continued on. The driver must have been 
shielded from the metal flying around above and 
behind him. Our eardrums were punched in and 
the grain around us was knocked down flat by 
the blast of the high velocity shot.  I tried to call 
a Typhoon in, to hit the gun, but the rain and low 
clouds had stopped all aircraft flying. The last 
plane we had seen was a German fighter which 
strafed us shortly after we crossed the start line.
The classic counterattack was beaten back with 
heavy fire from the FMR and a great number 
of artillery shells from the 4th Field Regiment. 
On our left a quarter of a mile away at Hubert 
Folie the Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry 
Highlanders (SDG) were dug in, but we had no 
liaison with them, unfortunately. We could have 
used some mutual support but we did not know 
their radio frequencies and evidently they did 
not know ours, they being 3rd Division and we 
2nd Division.
That night it rained off and on but despite that, 
several German patrols approached the farm in 
fairly large numbers. The FMR lost a few men as 
prisoners. I had registered an SOS task across 
the front of the company position which we fired 
effectively several times for a few minutes. The 
SOS signal for that day was red, red, green but 
I discovered that my Verey pistol ammunition 
was too swollen after being soaked for several 
hours in my wet pockets; - it simply wouldn’t fit 
into the chamber.
Our Verey flares came as a brass-based cardboard 
cartridge like a big shotgun shell, whereas the 
Germans used an all-metal case. Luckily we had 
captured a German FOO and I had taken his flare 
pistol with its ammo. Their red flares could be 
distinguished by a band of milling, and the green 
flares by a half band. White was plain. I kept my 
red flares in my left pocket (port side!) and green 
in my right (starboard!) otherwise I could not tell 
A 25-pounder in action in Normandy.
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ours apart in the darkness. The Germans were 
way ahead of us on this one.  (For some reason 
red and green were the two favoured flare colours 
in both armies).   Most distress signals to the 
guns consisted of 3 “shots”.
I had told my signal sergeant to forget about 
attempting to bring a field telephone line up to 
the position as the heavy shell-fire and tank traffic 
would make it impossible to maintain. This left 
us entirely dependant on radio and batteries 
were a problem. Our chore-horse battery charger 
was much too noisy to run so close to the enemy, 
but somehow during the night Sergeant Tom 
O’Rourke made it up to the OP on his motorcycle 
with some fully charged batteries strapped on 
behind him.  [He was later wounded and returned 
to Canada with me on the hospital ship Abba].
Very early the next morning another German 
attack came in, but without tank support. We 
repulsed it with relative ease, although they 
brought down a heavy preparatory concentration 
of artillery and mortar fire upon us. This cost 
us several more casualties.  Meanwhile another 
early attack on Beauvoir Farm to our right had 
been successful and the Germans took quite a 
few prisoners of “B” Company FMR. We watched 
them being marched off to Verrières. Captain 
Gord Hunter, my fellow FOO had been wounded, 
as I said, and his replacement had not yet come 
up from the gun position. This was undoubtedly 
a factor in the FMR losing Beauvoir. Naturally we 
felt very exposed after this German success. I was 
preoccupied at Troteval and could do nothing to 
help “B” Company .
During one of the brief lulls in activity a deserter 
who claimed to be a Polish conscript, approached 
the OP with his hands in the air; one of them 
waving a rag.  He had a pillowcase knotted to 
his waistbelt, which looked slightly suspicious. 
We were thinking of grenades, so made him 
dump the contents, which turned out to be about 
20 small cans of bully beef! These were the 
“iron rations” carried by German soldiers and, 
obviously, he had been collecting them from his 
dead comrades.  He said he had been hiding out 
“waiting for the Tommys.”
In the late afternoon still another German 
attack came in, the fifth, I think. This time 
supported by several Tiger tanks and some 
determined panzer grenadiers who persevered 
A close-up air photo of Troteval 
Farm taken on 31 July 1944.
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through our defensive fire.  “C” Company were 
down to 17 men, all ranks, twelve of whom 
were wounded.  Most ammunition was gone, 
including all the PIAT anti-tank ammo, so Major 
Mousseau, himself wounded, had no choice 
but to surrender.  Shortly before this, when the 
Germans overran the position, we agreed that 
as a last resort we would bring down artillery 
fire right on ourselves, as our people were in 
slit trenches and the attackers were exposed (a 
calculated but not uncommon risk). This we did 
for several minutes, using up a lot of ammunition, 
but inflicting many casualties on the infantry 
attackers. We had no anti-tank guns nor any of 
our own tanks to support us, so nothing could 
be done against the German Tigers.  I decided 
to make a run for it in the carrier, but after all 
the pouring rain it refused to start. We had to 
unload a wounded FMR officer from the rear 
compartment to get at the engine and meanwhile 
considered crawling away through the grain to 
avoid capture.  In preparation, I rolled my 12 X 
binoculars in my Burberry raincoat and pushed it 
down in the mud of my slit trench, expecting that 
I could recover both when we retook the position.
Most of the time we were communicating with 
FMR battalion headquarters on our 18 set. The 
“C” Company sets had been knocked out. We were 
quite forceful in our requests for reinforcements, 
but nothing appeared. I was also sending “sit-
reps” through 4th Field R/T channels on my 
No.19 set, begging for an additional company 
of infantry or even better, the reserve battalion. 
I believe that because this was the first action 
for 6th Brigade and its battalion commanders 
no one at HQ appreciated the importance of 
reinforcing “C” Company’s success. At that time 
the company at Troteval Farm was the only sub-
unit of 2nd Division still holding its objective. All 
others had been driven back by counterattacks. 
We held on at Troteval Farm largely because of 
terrific artillery fire, which amounted to over 600 
rounds per gun for 4th Field, during the battle, 
mostly fired on “Mike” targets (24 guns). Back-
breaking work in the rain and almost non-stop 
for the gunners. Needless to say I and my OP crew 
had been fighting all along as infantry, using our 
rifles to good effect although our Bren gun had 
jammed early on (full of mud!) and we never had 
time to clean it.
My driver, Bombardier Chris May, finally got the 
engine started and under cover of our exploding 
shells we made a run for it, coming under 
heavy fire from the co-ax machine guns of the 
German tanks.  (They would not waste the main 
armament on a tiny Bren carrier.) We could see 
white powder flying around us, which we feared 
might be phosphorous. This later turned out to 
be powdered hardtack of which we had lashed a 
large tin on top of the carrier. This was riddled 
with bullet holes. The same was true of a large 
PIAT box welded across the front, which had 
contained a few cans of bully beef and stew, 
now splattered gruesomely over everything, as 
well. But, the carrier armour withstood the fire 
although the paint was badly chipped.
I reported to Lieutenant-Colonel Gauvreau at the 
FMR battalion headquarters and told him that 
“C” Company had surrendered.  He reassigned 
me to Major White of “A” Company, the reserve 
company. Our task was to recapture Beauvoir 
Farm. We crawled through the grain and along 
some ditches getting quite close to Beauvoir where 
we saw two Tigers systematically swiveling on the 
FMR slit trenches to fill them in. It was obvious 
that we could not attack German armour with 
only infantry, so I cancelled my quick fire plan 
A soldier from the Fusiliers Mont-Royal
on patrol, 9  August 1944.
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and left Beauvoir for the future. We succeeded 
three days later.
The Germans established a fairly strong defensive 
position around Troteval Farm including a mine 
field. They also strengthened Verrières village 
right behind it, which gave us a much harder 
time a few days later (25 July) when the RHLI 
attacked successfully and I was wounded.  My 
friend Captain Jack Thompson, the other 14th 
Battery FOO, also with “The Rileys”, was killed.
After the war my brother-in-law, Warren Hurst, 
visited Troteval Farm, and saw that the hole in 
the wall had been rebuilt. The French farm family 
had survived the entire battle, hiding in the cellar. 
They lost one member killed, unfortunately.
I never went back. I wrote a citation for the 
Distinguished Service Order for Major Fernand 
Mousseau at the request of Lieutenant-Colonel 
Gavreau.  He did not get it, being a POW, although 
he had escaped from a German hospital dressed 
as a nurse, and rejoined the FMR in the fall.  I 
had lunch with him not long ago in Ottawa.
My driver, Bombardier May, and signaller, John 
Clark, were recommended for the Military Medal 
but instead received a mention-in-despatches. 
Both were later killed -  May on the 25th when 
our carrier hit a Tellermine while attacking with 
the RHLI.
In this first combat experience for 6th Brigade 
since Dieppe there were several lessons to be 
learned:
1) There was no liaison between the FMR of 
2nd Division and the neighbouring SDG of 3rd 
Division on our left;
2) Artillery FOOs should work with the infantry 
whom they normally support and know;
3) A tactical formation should not be varied 
on the eve of battle, after years of training (4 
battalions instead of 3);
4) Left Out of Battle (LOB) personnel should 
be sent up to replace assault casualties at the 
same time as replacement ammo;
5) A reserve company should not be left 
uncommitted while the two forward companies 
are fighting for their lives;
6) The successful battalion (FMR) should 
be strengthened or replaced with the brigade 
reserve when it is obviously in deep trouble;
7) Anti-tank guns should be deployed in the 
consolidation stage.  If the anti-tank guns are 
wiped out, then the supporting armour should be 
left overnight in close support and not withdrawn 
to Laager;
8) Attacking troops should be well rested and 
well fed in preparation;
9) Inexperienced commanders should not be 
combined with inexperienced troops.
A. Britton Smith joined the 32nd Battery, 
Canadian Field Artillery in 1935 when he 
was 15. He graduated from Royal Military 
College in 1940 and was posted to the 8th 
Field Regiment, RCA in England. In 1942 
Smith was promoted to Captain and sent 
to the 4th Field Regiment. He landed in 
Normandy with the rest of 2nd Division 
in July 1944. For his actions at Troteval 
Farm he was awarded the Military Cross. 
The citation reads:
On 21 July 1944 Captain Smith 
was Forward Observation Officer in 
“C” Company of the Fusiliers Mont 
Royal during the battalion attack on 
and subsequent defence of Troteval 
Farm, south of Caen in the Verrieres 
area. During the day the position 
was attacked by enemy infantry and 
tanks on four separate occasions. 
These attacks were all disorganized 
by artillery fire directed by Captain 
Smith who had to move to exposed 
positions under heavy fire to obtain 
the necessary observation. During one 
of these attacks, Captain Smith and 
his crew fought off and killed many of 
the enemy who had worked themselves 
to within 20 yards of the observation 
post. By his great coolness and bravery 
under heavy enemy fire as well as his 
complete disregard for his own safety, 
Captain Smith was largely responsible 
for Troteval Farm being held and for 
heavy casualties being inflicted on the 
enemy.
His war ended when he was wounded in 
Verrières village acting as a FOO for the 
Royal Hamilton Light Infantry. Following 
the war Smith attended law school. 
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